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Abstract: Agricultural policymakers are increasingly interested in the role of 
collective action to improve the effectiveness of natural resource management 
in rural areas. Analyses of socio-ecological systems highlight how distribution 
of benefits/cost is crucial for the success of cooperation among actors and hence 
it seems an element to take into account for the design of policies that focus on 
collective action. In this paper we use the Shapley value to ex-ante assess the dis-
tributional effect of collective conditionality constraints embedded in the policy, 
and their interaction with asymmetry in the access to the resource and with the 
social environment. We parameterise a model to a collective reservoir located in 
Emilia-Romagna (Italy), modelling the reservoir and the infrastructure connect-
ing the farms by using a network. The results show that distributional effect of the 
asymmetry in the access to the resource can be counteracted by properly setting 
minimum participation rules. However, the results highlight the potential difficul-
ties in designing agricultural policies dealing with collective action.
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1. Introduction
In recent decades, the scope of agricultural policies has greatly expanded to 
include the management of a wide range of natural resources in rural areas such as 
water and biodiversity (Bryan et al. 2011). In this field, agricultural policymakers 
are increasingly interested in the potential use of collective action as an effective 
tool to reach policy objectives (OECD 2013). In particular in Europe, measures 
addressing biodiversity protection and water management (quality and quantity) 
include collective conditionality constraints that link the eligibility for funding 
to the emergence of cooperation and coordination among farmers (Dupraz et al. 
2009; Kuhfuss et al. 2016).
The seminal book by Ostrom (1990) has proved to be a crucial step forward in 
the analysis of collective action and has contributed greatly to a renewed interest 
in this topic. Her studies challenged the once dominant view that collective action 
is doomed to fail in the absence of a well-functioning system of property rights, or 
a centralised top-down management (Hardin 1968). Studies on collective action 
have indeed shown the possibility for self-organised systems to successfully man-
age natural resources (e.g. Rasch et al. 2016). The study of collective action on 
natural resource management requires a system perspective that takes both the 
ecological and social contexts into account. The combination of the socio-eco-
nomic actors and the ecological environment, and their complex relationships, 
is often indicated by the term ‘socio-ecological system’ (SES) (Berkes et al. 
2000). Irrigation systems are an exemplary case of a complex SES given that they 
encompass close and rapid links between the natural resource (water) and the 
economic structure (agriculture), and hard (canal) and soft (distributional rules) 
human made infrastructure (Yu et al. 2015).
A number of studies have thoroughly investigated the determinants of the suc-
cess of reaching and managing cooperation. A list of design principles was sug-
gested by Ostrom (1990) and it has largely been empirically confirmed (Cox et al. 
2010; Baggio et al. 2016). Among others, one of the findings is that the distribution 
of resources and benefits (or costs) appears to be more relevant than previously 
thought (Janssen 2015). Several laboratory experiments indicate that inequality 
in earning is affected, for instance, by asymmetric access to key resources and in 
turn that it influences individual contributions of worst-off players to public good 
(e.g. Janssen et al. 2011; Anderies et al. 2013), and the acceptance of institutional 
arrangements (e.g. Kube et al. 2015).
462 Matteo Zavalloni et al.
Public policies are deemed to be important in the SES literature; yet they are 
de facto not explicitly modelled (Anderies and Janssen 2013), at least in the most 
common form (e.g. through incentives/subsidies, notably in Europe). Some of the 
findings of the SES literature, however, have implicitly relevant implications for 
the design of agricultural policies. For example, if considerations on collective 
action are embedded in the formulation of rural policies, the distributional effect 
of rural policies, and of their design elements seems to become an issue to be paid 
attention. Distributional considerations are rarely addressed in the literature on 
agri-environmental policies (Ohl et al. 2008) even though they are acknowledged 
to be relevant (Segerson 2013; Wätzold and Drechsler 2014).
In this paper, we investigate the distributional impact of rural policies that 
focus on collective action. More specifically we assess ex-ante how the imposi-
tion of different levels of collective conditionality constraints linked to policy 
incentives affects the distribution of costs within a group of heterogeneous farm-
ers that cooperate through investment in a collective reservoir and in the related 
water distribution network. In particular, we focus on the distributional effect of 
the minimum participation rule (MPR), the threshold, in this case set at the quan-
tity of water stored, above which a given project is eligible for financial support. 
Moreover, we explore how this design element interacts with: 1) the spatial spread 
of farms and associated asymmetric resource access, and 2) the social environ-
ment (i.e. the degree of collaboration among farmers). 
The methodology we employ is developed by way of a cooperative game 
theory (CGT) framework. First, we formulate the characteristic function (CF) 
of the game, namely the value that any possible group of people cooperating, 
hereinafter a ‘coalition’, can obtain. In our case, the CF is represented by the 
minimum cost that a group of farmers faces in order to build a reservoir. We 
assume that the CF is affected by the policy scheme, the geography of the farms 
(modelled as nodes of a network) and the social environment. Second, given the 
CF, we use the Shapley value (SV), one of the most important solutions devel-
oped by CGT (Shapley 1953), to assess how farmers are likely to distribute the 
cost of investments in infrastructure. The SV can be interpreted as the expected 
value of cooperating when social preferences on institutional arrangements are 
unknown (Slikker and van den Nouweland 2012). In this case, we use the SV in 
a positive manner, to have a proxy for the likely distribution of costs faced in a 
common project, under different policy and social scenarios. Since we empiri-
cally parameterise the analysis, and given the difficulty of computing the SV for 
a large number of players, the assessment of the SV is approached by employing 
a sampling procedure (Castro et al. 2009). We also statistically analyse the model 
results to have a better understanding of the determinants of the SV attributed to 
the farmers.
The analysis is empirically based on a case study in the Province of Ravenna, 
in Emilia-Romagna (E-R), Italy. The case study is selected because the E-R Rural 
Development Plan (RDP) 2007–2013, one of the most noteworthy agricultural 
policies in Europe, through Measure 125, provides financial support for the 
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construction of reservoirs with an eye to reducing the pressure on groundwater 
resources (E-R 2015). Such a measure explicitly defines two minimum participa-
tion constraints for the eligible projects (on the number of users, 20 farmers, and 
on the capacity of the reservoirs, 50,000 m3). Irrigation infrastructures such as res-
ervoirs, in addition to being SES typical, are ever more important as factors such 
as climate change are increasingly putting pressure on water resources (Galelli 
and Soncini-Sessa 2010; Xie and Zilberman 2016).
This paper seeks to combine the lessons of the SES literature with the recent 
interest in embedding collective approaches in agricultural policies aimed at natu-
ral resource management in rural areas. On one hand, the paper adds the agri-
cultural policies to the issues that are usually analysed by the SES literature. On 
the other hand, it introduces distributional considerations to the elements that are 
most likely to be addressed in the design of collective conditionality constraints 
in rural policies. MPR in other contexts are suggested to influence the bargaining 
power of players and are thus likely to have distributional effects (McEvoy et al. 
2015; Kesternich 2016).
Distributional issues related to water management have long been analysed 
in the context of both water allocation and infrastructure (investment and main-
tenance) cost sharing (Ostrom 1990; Dayton-Johnson 2003). For example, from 
a theoretical point of view, Marchiori (2014) assesses how sharing rules are 
determined by the degree of complementarity in individual efforts toward the 
irrigation infrastructure maintenance. Using both a theoretical and an empirical 
model, Dayton-Johnson (Dayton-Johnson 2000) analysed the choice of 48 farm 
managed irrigation systems in Mexico over sharing rules, finding that inequal-
ity strongly encourages the choice of a proportional allocation rule. In real case 
examples, a number of rules have been applied and suggested with respect to 
water allocation: prior appropriation (Garrick et al. 2013), proportional and 
equity rules (Dayton-Johnson 2003) and water markets (Easter et al. 1999). With 
respect to cost sharing, area-based charges and volumetric pricing are among the 
most commonly used sharing rules (Easter and Liu 2007). In our case study, the 
investment is usually shared proportionally to the amount of water requested by 
each farm. The SV, as well as other CGT solutions, addresses this problem by 
normatively formulating a fair and efficient rule that can be applied to both ben-
efits and cost sharing. The SV has been suggested as an appropriate methodol-
ogy for the analysis of collective action (Madani and Dinar 2012). The practical 
implementability of these solutions is limited given the complexity of their cal-
culation when a large number of players are involved. Nonetheless, their analyti-
cal power is strong as they make it possible to highlight subtle bargaining issues 
that would otherwise have been hidden.
The SV and other CGT solutions have often been applied to different aspects 
of water resource management, such as sharing benefits from groundwater 
(Madani and Dinar 2012), international rivers (Dinar and Nigatu 2013), waste-
water treatment plans (Loehman et al. 1979) and regional water supply (Young 
et al. 1982), including application to networks (Dong et al. 2012). However, most 
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of these studies include illustrative examples that only consider a limited number 
of players (typically from 3 to 5) since CGT solutions are notoriously difficult 
to apply to larger systems. In addition to the application to a larger system (26 
farmers), we also include the effect of non-cooperative behaviour of agents in the 
analysis, unlike yet at the same time in line with the work of Madani and Dinar 
(2012) that also analyses how personal characteristics of individual players influ-
ence the final outcome of CGT solutions. A network analysis is increasingly used 
in environmental economics, for instance, to model access to resources (Currarini 
et al. 2016) and is often combined with CGT (Slikker and van den Nouweland 
2012; Currarini et al. 2016).
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we describe the methodology, 
indicating how the CF is formulated, and how the SV is affected by the different 
determinants that we are interested in. Section 3 describes the numerical applica-
tion to the case study area. Finally, section 4 presents the results and is followed 
by the Discussion (5) and Conclusions (6).
2. Methodology
2.1. Characteristic function
Assume that a number of farms need to build a reservoir to make water available 
for irrigation. Further imagine that farms can either build individual reservoirs or 
pool their resources together to build a single collective reservoir. Let {1, 2, …, 
f} = F be the population of farms. The term ‘grand-coalition’ denotes the situa-
tion in which the entire population collaborates. {i} (i = 1, 2, … f) are the single-
ton coalitions. We use the symbol S to represent the feasible coalitions in the 
game, and s and t constitute two possible coalitions of F within S. V(s) denotes 
the CF of the game, that attributes a value to any given coalition (Loehman et 
al. 1979); such a value in our case is the minimum investment cost required for 
the construction of the reservoir. The usual assumption in the CF is that it is not 
affected by action and choices of non-members of the coalition. Moreover, in a 
cost allocation game, subadditivity is also assumed: v(s ∪ t) ≤ v(s) + v(t) with 
s ∩ t = ∅, ∀s, t ∈ S. Subadditivity entails that cooperation is the most conve-
nient option, leading to the greatest cost saving. In our case, the subadditivity of 
the game follows from the assumption that construction costs are concave (see 
below).
Given this general framework, we define the CF in the next part. First, we 
describe the construction cost of the reservoir, and how, in case of a collective 
one, it is also affected by the spatial distribution of the farms. Geography is 
accounted for by modelling farms as nodes of a network, which in turn is used 
to determine the cost of connections to the collective reservoir and to model the 
asymmetric spatial spread of the farms around it. Second, we introduce the collec-
tive conditionality constraints linked to the policy subsidy and the social environ-
ment. Concerning the policy, we assume that the policy subsidy is granted only 
when the coalition size is bigger than an exogenous MPR. The social environment 
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is assessed by formulating two scenarios in which we differentiate the degree 
of  collaboration among farms. The mathematical description of these elements 
follows.
Assume that the quantity of water demanded by each farm is fixed and referred 
to as q
i
. There are four elements that affect the total costs (TC) of the investment 
in a reservoir: the cost of the construction (C), the fixed costs (L), the managerial 
and running costs (M), and the cost of the distribution network (K):
 = + + +C L M KTC  (1)
Now we observe all of the elements in detail.
First, the construction costs of a reservoir are represented by a concave 
 function of the aggregated amount of water requested by the farmers under 
 consideration ( )= ∑ .i
i
C C q  The fixed costs L  represent the costs that do not vary 
with the number of users or with the quantity of water stored: for instance, they 
may represent the opportunity costs of allocating land to a reservoir rather than 
to farming activities. The managerial costs M are, for instance, energy costs and 
constitute a function of the quantity of water stored: ( )= ∑ .i
i
M m q
The fourth element, K, relates to the pipe connections, which are modelled 
as a network tree (N, G). We assume that these costs apply only to the construction 
of the collective reservoir. The nodes N = {1, …, n} of the network are both the 
farms (F = {1…, n − 1}) and the collective reservoir {n}. The nth node, the one 
representing such a reservoir, is denoted for simplicity by “r”. G is a n × n matrix 
representing the weighted directed relations between each node (water flows in 





 is non-zero. The weights represent the distances between the farms. 
We assume that the network is directed toward the collective reservoir, so that 
g
ri
 = 0 ∀ i ∈ N. The cost of the network depends on both the length of the pipes 
(links) and the amount of water that must flow through the pipes (a larger amount 
of water requires wider pipes). Observe, for example, in Figure 1 that the amount 
of water requested by a, b and c must flow through the link cr. While the distance 
is easily computed, assessing the amount of water makes it necessary to determine 
the nodes that need to use a given link. To do so, we find the path to the collec-
tive reservoir for each node, we assess the paths that a given farm belongs to, and 
finally we compute the amount of water that passes through each link. First, P
ir
 
denotes the subset of nodes representing the shortest path from each farm i to the 
reservoir r;1 for example, farm b’s path includes nodes b, c and r. Second, for each 
farm, D
i
 represents the subset of farms for which i belongs to the path, namely: 
D
i
 = {i} ∪ {j: i ∈ P
jr
, i ≠ j}. That is, D
i
 is the set of nodes in the sub-tree rooted at 
i. For instance, in the network in Figure 1, farm c belongs to the paths of farms a 
1 It is the shortest path since in a tree there is only one path connecting two nodes.
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and b in addition to c, hence we have D
c
 = {c} ∪ {a, b} = {a, b, c}. Farm a does 
not belong to any path, so D
a
 = {a} ∪ {∅} = {a}.
Finally, the amount of water passing through each link (w
ij






w q  namely the sum of the amount of water of the farms whose paths pass 
through link ij – all of the elements (z) of the subset D
i
. The cost for each link is 
then a function of the weights (the length of the link) and of the amount of water 






). The total cost of the network is hence 




K k  The cost of an individual reservoir does not include the pipe 
network, hence the case of individual reservoirs is included in equation (1) simply 
by setting k = 0. 
Having described how the costs are determined, we now move to the policy 
and the social component that affects the CF.
First, we introduce the financial support that we assume is granted only when 
the amount of water of the coalition is greater than an exogenously given MPR 
level qt. Given financial support rate α, the coalitions face 1 – α share of the costs. 
The actual policies define in detail the cost typologies that are eligible for support: 
these are de facto only the construction costs. The managerial costs or the costs 
associated with the acquisition of land are excluded from the support, and the CF 
is formulated accordingly. We further assume that the collective reservoir can be 
built only in cases where the MPR is met. This assumption reflects an observation 
of the case study area, whereby collective reservoirs are actually planned and built 
(through the technical assistance of the local water user association) only when 
the MPR is met.
Second, we assess how the CF is affected by two social environments dif-
ferentiated by two distinctive attitudes toward collaboration among farmers. We 
thus formulate two scenarios and two CFs. In the collaborative scenario (CO), 
we assume that there are no impediments to the construction of the collective 
reservoir and the related distribution network. In the non-collaborative scenario 
(NC), the formation of the coalition associated with the construction of the res-
ervoir depends on the access to the reservoir, which is in turn conditional on the 
a c r
b
Figure 1: Example of a network in which a, b, and c represent farms, and r represents the 
reservoir.
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members of the coalition. More specifically, we assume in this second scenario, 
that access to the reservoir is impeded by any non-member of the coalition that is 
in the path of any members of the coalition. Consider, for example, the network 
depicted in Figure 1. In the NC scenario, the group of farms {a, b} needs to pass 
through farm c to have access to the reservoir. However, if c is not a member of 
the coalition it may impede access to the water. In such a case, we assume that 
the potential coalition members, farms a and b, partition themselves in singleton 
coalitions and build individual reservoirs. 
The combination of the cost function, the policy support and the two social 
environments thus define two CF that are described below.
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t
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=∑  In the expression (1 − α)C(qi), α is greater than 0 for those 
farms that meet conditions q
i
 > qt. The CF states that in case the aggregated water 
requested by any given group of farmers is lower than the MPR level, the costs 
for this group are simply given by the sum of the cost of building individual res-
ervoirs. Instead, if the MPR is met, the group compares the cost of building indi-
vidual reservoirs with the cost of building a single collective reservoir. Since the 
MPR can be met even by a single farm, its costs can also be partially subsidised 
in the individual case.
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min (1 ) ( ) ;   (1 ) ( )        otherwise
t
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C q L M j s P s q q
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=∑  In the expression (1 − α)C(qi), α is greater than 0 only for those 
farms that meet conditions q
i
 > qt. The only difference with the previous CF is the 
additional constraint that the collective reservoirs cannot be chosen if any mem-
ber of the coalition is not part of the path.
2.2. The Shapley value
Given both the CF and the subadditivity assumption, the farmers have incentives 
to fully cooperate and form a grand coalition. The SV attributes to each individual 
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farmer a share of the costs of the grand coalition that depends on the bargaining 
power determined by the CF. The SV is a unique solution defined by (Shapley 
1971, 1953):
 
( | |)!(| | 1)






u v s v s i
f⊆
− −= − −∑  (4)
where for ∀ i ∈ N: |s| is the number of the members of any coalition s, and f is the 
total number of participants in the game (Madani and Dinar 2012). Equation (4) 
states that the worth attributed to the ith player through the SV is given by its aver-
age marginal contribution to any possible grouping of the players. The marginal 
contribution of player i is given by the expression v(s) – v(s–{i}). In other terms, 
i’s marginal contribution is the additional cost that a group of people cooperat-
ing face when i is added to the coalition. The SV reflects the bargaining power 
of the players and attributes the efficient and fair share of the value of the grand 
coalition.
As stated in the introduction, we are interested in how the asymmetry in access 
to the resource, the degree of collaboration and the MPR interact to determine 
the bargaining power of the players and the resulting SV. Some simple examples 
clarify how these elements affect the SV. Imagine 3 farms positioned in a network 
like the one in Figure 1.
The first obvious element is that the connections of farms that are farther 
away from the reservoir cause an increase in the cost for the coalition, and thus, 
all things being equal, have a relatively higher share of the grand coalition’s 
costs. 
The second potential effect is due to the combination of the position in the 
network and the social scenarios. We use once again the example in Figure 1. 
Imagine each farm needs q
i





∑  with no connection costs. In the CO scenario, the CF is symmetric, 
since the network does not affect it. We thus have v(i, j) = 60.5 = 2.45, so that the 
marginal contribution of a third player z to the grand-coalition is v(i, j, z) – v(i, 
j) = 3 – 2.45 = 0.55. The SV simply equally divides the costs among the players: 
ui = 1. In the NC scenario, the CF is no longer symmetric. Farmer c impedes 
coalition {a, b} from collaborating in the building of the collective reservoir, so 
that v(a, b) = v(a) + v(b) = 1.7 + 1.7 = 3.5. The marginal contribution of c to {a, 
b, c} is v(a, b, c) – v(a, b) = 3 – 3.5 = −0.5. Accordingly, in the second case the 
marginal contribution of c is so high that he/she should not be allocated any cost, 
but instead {a, b} should pay for the entrance of c into the coalition. Clearly, in 
the second case, in the NC environment, the power of c is much greater, and as a 
result, its share of the costs is lower. The final share of the grand-coalition costs 
is: m
c





A third potential effect is due to the effect of the MPR when players are het-




 = 2 and q
c
 = 5. We maintain the same cost 
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function of the previous example whilst adding the policy element, a subsidy that 
reduces the costs faced by the farmers: α
∈
− ∑(1 ) i
i s




≥∑  0 
otherwise. If there is no MPR, qt = 0 and all of the farms receive financial support. 
Following equation (4) we find the SV. For instance, the marginal contribution of 
player c to the grand coalition is v(a, b, c) – v(a, b) = 1.5 – 1 = 0.5. Ultimately, the 




 = 0.4 and q
c
 = 0.7 and the difference between the 
players is only due to the differences in the quantity of water requested. Now we 
change the MPR level to qt = 5. At this new level, players a and b are singletons and 
can no longer obtain financial support as a coalition, whereas the grand coalition 
and the other coalitions’ costs are unaltered. Player c becomes a pivotal player 
in determining the access to the financial support for any coalition. For example, 
player c’s marginal contribution to the grand coalition is now v(a, b, c) – v(a, 




 = 0.7 and q
c
 = 0.2. 
The change in the MPR does not affect the final costs faced by the grand coalition, 
but does have a distributional effect.
Clearly, all of these effects interact with each other and are ultimately depen-
dent on the actual characteristics of the system under analysis. In the next section 
we parameterise the model on a real case study. To differentiate the distribution 
of costs across scenarios, we use tiu  and 
t
im  to indicate the cost allocated to 
each player, according to the SV, respectively, in the CO scenario and in the NC 
 scenario for any level of qt.
3. Case study and data
The model is applied to one of the reservoirs financed by Measure 125 (E-R 
2015) of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the hilly area of the province 
of Ravenna, where irrigation water is managed by the Consorzio di Bonifica della 
Romagna Occidentale (CBRO), a local water user association. The choice of the 
area is due to the relative importance of irrigation and reservoirs for the local 
agriculture. Seven (7) per cent of the irrigated area in the case study region is 
served by reservoirs, which is considerably higher than the average share served 
by reservoirs in the hilly areas of E-R (2%) (ISTAT 2010). The area is also char-
acterised by a high rate of successful applications to Measure 125, since out of 
the 16 projects financed in E-R, 8 were located in the case study area (E-R 2013, 
2012). The importance of irrigation in the case study area is suggested by observ-
ing how, in the period 1982–2010, the share of irrigated areas over the total 
utilised agricultural area has remained steady at the regional level (around 10%), 
but has increased markedly from 2% to 16% in the hilly part of the Province of 
Ravenna (ISTAT 2010). In this area, the number of users in each reservoir is in 
the range of 20–50 (CBRO 2015). The group of farmers using the same reser-
voirs are organised in a ‘consorzio’, an organisation that is responsible for the 
governance of the reservoirs, including cost allocation and conflict resolution. 
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The CBRO (€), however, provides assistance for the technical  management of 
the reservoirs.
In the reservoir that we use to parameterise our analysis, 26 farms are con-
nected to the reservoir, and are entitled to heterogeneous water quotas. The res-
ervoir capacity is about 50,000 m3, subdivided into 74 quotas the distribution of 
which is described in Table 1. Each quota grants the right to use 676 m3 of water. 
It is worth noting that the reservoir capacity is just at the threshold level of eligi-
bility for Measure 125.
Farms are connected to the reservoir by way of pressurised water pipes. A 
network is used both to represent the spatial location of the farms and to account 
for the technical choice that motivated the design of the pipe network (Appendix, 
Table 6). The pipe connections form a directed tree, with two major branches, 
composed of approximately the same number of nodes, directed to the reservoir 
(Appendix, Figure 5). To better account for the spatial spread of the farms, we 
introduced nodes into the network that do not represent farms, but are rather used 
to model bifurcations in the pipe network. The farms are located along a valley, 
with water running from southwest to northeast.
The cost of the reservoir construction is assumed to be determined by the fol-
lowing function, which was built in collaboration with officials of the CBRO (€): 
140(Q
s
)0.641. The cost function parameters related to the pipe network were selected 
according to the real costs of pipes and according to the actual pipes used in the 
example (Table 2).
Table 1: Distribution of water quotas per farm.
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Other relevant parameters include the following. We consider a fixed price 
as the cost of land and we set L = 40,000 € for the collective reservoir; running 
costs are set at M = 0.4 €/m3 for individual reservoirs, and at M = 0.15 €/m3 for the 
collective reservoir. The financial support is assumed to cover 50% of the costs; 
the policy actually covers 70%, but some of the costs are not eligible for financial 
support, so the ultimate support covers less than the nominal 70%. We run a sen-
sitivity analysis on qt, using a range of values from qt = 0 to qt = 50,000 which is 
the actual threshold in Measure 125.
For the computation of the SV we use the sampling approach and the algo-
rithm developed by Castro et al. (2009). The algorithm exploits an alternative 
form for Equation (4) to compute the SV. In particular, the SV can be recursively 
computed by: 1) taking a possible permutation of the population of the players, 2) 
attributing to player i the marginal contribution that he or she gives to the coalition 
formed by the players that proceed them in the given permutation, and 3) taking 
the average of the marginal contributions over the possible permutations. The 
algorithm uses a sample of the possible permutations to arrive at an estimate of 
the SV. We use a sample of 10,000 orderings of players.
4. Results
We first present the results of the model, then carry out an OLS regression on the 
model results to have a better understanding of the forces at work. Farms are clas-
sified according to the amount of water requested (quotas). 
Figure 2 shows on the y-axes the costs per quota allocated in the two scenar-
ios, /ti iu q  (€/quota, above) and /
t
i im q  (€/quota, below), under a different level 
of the MPR (x-axes). The graphs are differentiated by farm classes based on the 
amount of water quotas; in each graph, the circles indicate the cost of quotas for 
each farm. The graphs show that in the CO scenario the MPR affects farm cost 
allocations according to the quota owned: farms with ‘small’ quotas (1–2) tend to 
be allocated higher costs as qt increases; the opposite occurs for farms with larger 
amounts (3–4–8). In the NC scenario, the effect of the MPR is much less evident. 
It is worth recalling from Section 2.1 that the collective reservoir can only be 
built when the project is eligible for regional financial support. As qt increases, 
the probability that larger farms are pivotal players in determining whether the 
financial support is granted (when the MPR is met) increases as well. As a result, 
their importance is likely to be higher, and in turn, their cost share diminishes. In 
the NC scenario, in addition to the MPR, the collective reservoir can be built only 
when the players on the path to the reservoir site are all members of the coalition 
(from Section 2.1). Recalling that the network is a directed tree, the non-member-
ship of some players can thus impede cooperation even though it would be profit-
able, and even though the MPR is met. Position in the network hence becomes a 
crucial element in affecting the bargaining power of the players, with respect to 
the CO scenario. Owned quotas become relatively less important, or position in 
the network attributes higher power, so that the effect of the MPR vanishes. 

































































































Figure 2: Allocation of the grand-coalition costs per quota in the CO scenario ( / ,ti iu q  upper 
graph – A) and in the NC scenario ( / ,ti im q  bottom graph -B) under different MPR levels.
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To further analyse the differences between the scenarios, Figure 3 shows the 
average costs per farm classes in the CO and NC scenarios and Figure 4 depicts 
the related coefficient of variation (CV, the ratio of the standard deviation to the 
average). The pictures show that when qt = 0 (no MPR) the allocation of costs 
in the CO scenario is much less variable (CV = 0.4) than in the NC scenario 
(CV = 1.02). Moving to the right, by increasing qt up to 45,000, the CO scenario 
is more affected by changes in policy than the NC scenario: the CV of /ti iu q  
varies between 0.7 and 0.4; the CV of /ti im q  varies between 1.5 and 1.0. When 
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Figure 3: Average SV in the CO scenario (upper graph) and in the NC scenario (bottom graph) 
per classes of farms.
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subsidy of the regional government) the CV of the CO scenario (0.10) is very 
similar to the one in the NC scenario (0.11). In such a case only the grand coali-
tion (when all of the players cooperate) is eligible for the regional subsidy, and the 
pivotal player is always the last one in any given order. In other words, the prob-
ability of being the pivotal player does not depend on any personal characteristics 
of the players (such as water quotas, or network position). Each player has the 
same probability as any other player to become pivotal, and as a result bargaining 
power and costs allocated become very similar across players. The position in 
the network is much less important in affecting the largest marginal contribution, 
namely when a player is the pivotal one in determining access to the financial 
support. Moreover, it is worth noting that in this setting the MPR at the unanimity 
level affects the cost distribution much more in a non-collaborative environment 
than in a collaborative environment.
To disentangle the different elements that affect the individual cost alloca-
tion in the two scenarios we carry out an ex-post analysis of the model results by 
way of OLS regressions. It is clear that the regressions are not aimed at testing 
the validity of a model, but rather to gain an understanding of the (simulated) 
model results. Two regression models are formulated with the same explanatory 
variables, and with two dependent variables, that is tiu  and .
t
im  The explanatory 
variables (listed in Table 3) reflect the theoretical analysis of Section 2.2, where, 
by means of a simple example, we observed how the distance and the position of 
the farm in the network affect the SV. To account for the effect of the MPR, we 
also consider the ‘power’ of the players. The assessment of the ‘power’ of players 
in a cooperative game is one of the earliest applications of the SV, which has been 
used, notably, to assess the distribution of power within a committee (Shapley and 
Shubik 1954). The idea is that in an election, a decision is approved only when 
the sum of the (possibly weighted) votes (say q
i
) are higher than a given threshold 
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Figure 4: Coefficient of variation (CV) of average SV in the CO scenario (squares) and in the 
NC scenario (circles).
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is then the relative frequency with which a player is the pivotal player. The com-
mittee game clearly resembles the policy game that we have modelled here (the 
regional subsidy is granted only when the reservoir capacity is larger than a prede-
termined threshold). The power, therefore, also includes the relationship between 
owned quotas and the policy threshold. The inclusion of such an explanatory vari-
able in the model is aimed at disentangling the effect of power with respect to 
the policy from the other factors that affect the benefit distribution (economies of 
scale and network costs).
Results are provided respectively in Tables 4 and 5. The regression analysis 
applied to the model results shows that q
i
 is clearly positively related to both tiu  
and :tim  the higher the quota, the higher the costs allocated to a farm. However, 
the relative importance of q
i
 is reduced from the CO scenario (beta = 1.1) to the 
NC scenario (beta = 0.5). This indicates that the social environment reduces the 
importance of the personal characteristics of the players (the water demanded), 
and other elements become more relevant. One of these is the position in the net-
work. Indeed, the |D
i
| coefficient switches signs and increases in absolute value 
when passing from CO (beta = 0.323) to NC (beta = −0.541). The network posi-
tion is crucial in the NC scenario since well-positioned players (relatively closer 
to the reservoir) effectively block the formation of the coalition and hence have 
greater bargaining power. Finally, the power of the players (“power”) is negatively 




The amount of water requested by each farm
Distance The distance of each farm from the reservoir
|D
i




The amount of water passing through each farm
Power The power of each player
Table 4: Regression analysis of the cost allocation in the CO scenario.
Explanatory 
variables
Unstandardised coefficients Standardised 
coefficients
t Sign.
B Std. error Beta
(Constant) 6079.191 1005.981 6.043 0.000
q
i
3566.437 316.49 1.113 11.269 0.000
Distance (km) 0.789 0.19 0.24 4.149 0.000
|D
i
| 456.278 135.765 0.323 3.361 0.001
w
ij
−0.344 0.065 −0.636 −5.272 0.000
Power −107436.721 17284.063 −0.498 −6.216 0.000
The dependent variable is .tiu
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related to both tiu  and ,
t
im  (the greater the power, the lower the allocated cost), 
but loses significance in the NC scenario (significance = 0.075). The importance 
of being a pivotal player in the policy game is reduced, again, to the advantage of 
the position. Thus, the regressions further show how policy rules (MPR) interact 
with farm characteristics (water needs), spatial relations and social structure (col-
laborative versus non-collaborative scenarios) to determine the bargaining power 
of the players.
5. Discussion
In this paper, we use the SV as a way to assess how the geography of a given area, 
the individual characteristic of SES users, the social environment in which the 
users find themselves and policy rules interact to affect the distribution of the cost 
in a collective reservoir. 
As noted by Anderies et al. (2013), asymmetric access to resources can result 
in an unequal distribution of benefits. The results of our paper underpin this find-
ing, and further suggest that the degree of inequality also depends on the social 
environment of the actors. Indeed, we observe, not surprisingly, that an uncoop-
erative social environment exacerbates the effect that the asymmetry in the access 
to the resource has on the potential distribution of costs in a collective reservoir. 
The coefficient of variation in the SV, without explicitly modelling a bargaining 
process, is relatively higher in the NC scenario than in the CO scenario, since 
it allows the structure of the network to emerge, as well as the position of the 
individual players in the network, in the bargaining power of the players. The 
geography of the area is a much milder determinant of the distribution of the 
costs when players are relatively more collaborative. Janssen et al. (2015) found 
similar results and observed in an experimental setting that the limited availability 
of information on the behaviour of other players tends to increase the inequality 
arising from asymmetric access to resources.
While geography is a clear determinant of access to the resource, as suggested 
by Yu et al. (2015), more than ever, people interact with one another and the envi-
Table 5: Regression analysis of the cost allocation in the NC scenario.
Explanatory 
variables
Unstandardised coefficients Standardised 
coefficients
t Sign.
B Std. error Beta
(Constant) 12640.162 1984.766 6.369 0.000
q
i
4035.225 624.423 0.446 6.462 0.000
Distance (km) 1.857 0.375 0.200 4.953 0.000
|D
i
| −2160.643 267.86 −0.541 −8.066 0.000
w
ij
−0.321 0.129 −0.210 −2.497 0.013
power −60843.952 34100.853 −0.100 −1.784 0.075
The dependent variable is .tim
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ronment through shared human-made infrastructure (the Internet, transportation, 
the energy grid, etc.), the design of the infrastructure could, however, mitigate 
this effect. In this paper we add to this the effect of policy on the functioning of 
the SES. The results indicate that on one hand policies could have a distributional 
effect, and on the other hand that they could be designed in such a way as to 
counteract the distributional effect of the natural asymmetry in the access to the 
resource. Increasing the MPR level results in a decrease in the bargaining power 
of the smaller players in the CO scenario so that a relatively higher share of the 
cost is allocated to them. In the NC scenario, the policy is relatively less important 
since the bargaining power is more affected by the position in the network than by 
the policy’s collective conditionality constraints. However, the local characteris-
tics of the SES in affecting the bargaining power are greatly diminished when set-
ting a MPR so high that the contribution of all of the players is required to obtain 
financial support from the regional government.
The difficulties in computing the SV for a large number of players clearly 
limit the extent to which the SV can be used as an actual rule for the sharing of 
the costs and benefits of cooperation. In most cases simpler methods, such as pro-
portional share, are used. Measure 125 of the E-R RDP does not impose any cost 
sharing rule on the groups of farms. In our case study area, for the sake of sim-
plicity, the most commonly adopted rule is to allocate costs proportionally to the 










 Obviously, this rule does not address spatial issues and is 










€  The actual cost allocation resembles the results of the SV only 
when the MPR is set at the unanimity level. In other words, the actual sharing rule 
annihilates any potential bargaining power emerging from either the spatial distri-
bution of the farms across the landscape or from the MPR. While undoubtedly one 
motivation for the adoption of such a rule is its simplicity, further analysis of the 
social environment in the area would shed further light on local preferences with 
regard to inequality and distributional rules. Furthermore, it is worth considering 
that the SV is only one of the possible ways of sharing benefits amongst players 
proposed by CGT. For example, the Nash bargaining solution, and its extension 
to the n-player case (Nash-Harsanyi solution), gives more weight to the single-
ton payoffs (the disagreement points). A number of indices have been developed 
and applied to test the fairness of different allocation rules (Madani and Dinar 
2012). A potential extension of the current paper is to compare the SV allocation 
with other allocation rules, and experimentally test them to assess which one is 
preferred.
One important issue related to cooperation is that of stability. The “core” of 
a game represents a solution developed by CGT that addresses this issue, and 
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indicates the set of allocation points that are stable, or, in other words, that are 
most likely to be acceptable to all players (Gillies 1959). The analysis of the 
core, while outside the scope of the paper, is an important aspect that deserves 
further attention. The “emptiness” of the core, an incentive structure that leads 
to an unstable grand-coalition, might represent an explanation for the failure of 
cooperation. In turn, a relevant question that could arise from the policy point of 
view is how to set incentives/subsidies to transform the game in such a way as to 
have a non-empty core.
Finally, our analysis is static and assumes cooperative behaviour in a situation 
where cooperation represents the Pareto optimum. Despite this clear limitation, 
the use of the SV seems to be an appropriate tool to carry out a general ex-ante 
assessment of distributional effects. Indeed, the use of a non-cooperative game 
theory model would require the specification of the strategic behaviour and a wide 
range of parameters such as, for example, trust, inequality aversion and risk aver-
sion, which are both difficult and costly to assess. The use of the SV represents 
a shortcut to easily model the distributional effect resulting from a bargaining 
process that has not been explicitly framed. 
6. Conclusions
Given the importance of distributional issues for the success of collective action, 
the distributional effect of rural policies that affect SES seem to be an impor-
tant element to take into account in the design of such policies. In this paper 
we use the SV to have an empirical and ex-ante assessment of the distributional 
effect of MPR linked to the construction of a collective reservoir. We empiri-
cally parameterise our model to a collective reservoir located in Emilia-Romagna 
(Italy), modelling the reservoir and the infrastructure connecting the farms by 
way of a network. Moreover, we run two alternative social scenarios in which 
we differentiate the attitudes toward cooperation. We ultimately assess how: a) 
the asymmetry in access to the resource, b) the social environment c) the collec-
tive conditionality constraints and d) personal characteristics affect the bargaining 
power of the players and hence their share in the investment costs. 
The results point out how geography and social environments highly affect 
the distribution of costs related to the construction of a collective reservoir. This 
indeed corroborates the practical problems inherent in bringing farmers together 
in collective actions, and highlights the fact that difficulties can arise not only 
from lack of information or distrust, but also from genuinely different economic 
interests. Yet these determinants can be counteracted by the imposition of a rela-
tively high MPR that imposes cooperation on the entire population of farmers. 
On the other hand, the interaction between the MPR and the specific structure of 
the network hints at the need to avoid using such an instrument blindly, but rather 
to adapt the MPR to the specific potential coordination problems in different 
areas. This is particularly relevant in areas such as the case study area, which are 
characterised by semi-hilly environments, in which the size, crop  specialisations, 
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location of individual farms and distances tend to be rather heterogeneous. In 
addition, the structure of the network could be even much less ‘regular’ than the 
one presented here. At the same time, the difference between the two institutional 
scenarios not only reflects the role of different conditions, but also highlights 
the need for policymakers to focus attention on both direct incentives and build-
ing a suitably collaborative environment through information and demonstration 
actions. The consistency of policy over time may also help by supporting greater 
trust and predictability of results on the part of farmers.
Altogether these findings highlight the difficulty in designing agricultural 
policies that address collective action and SES. Agricultural policies are often 
set at the regional level and applied to a variety of SES that differ in terms of 
geography, heterogeneity of farming and social environment. Cooperation and 
collective action could be one of the answers to the double challenge of feed-
ing an increasing population and the need for today’s agriculture to sustain-
ably and efficiently use key natural resources. Yet embedding collective action 
and the promotion of cooperation pose a noteworthy challenge for the design 
of agricultural policies that undoubtedly require interdisciplinary research and 
flexibility.
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Figure 5: Graphical representation of the network used in the paper. The network does not 
account for the actual position in the landscape.
